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Sherry, a fortified wine produced in the Jerez region (Southern Spain), showed a
rapidly expansion of their exports to Britain during the 19th century, reaching its highest
level between 1867 and 1877. During this period, the production of sherry was strictly
limited and the growth of demand created supply problems which encouraged the blend of
sherry with cheap wines from other regions. Additionally, the outbreak of oïdium (a vine
disease) rapidly reduced the supply of wine and provoked a steady increase in the prices
during 1856-1865, furthering cheap imitations of sherry. The sale of inferior and cheap
wines finally damaged the sherry reputation and caused the rapidly decline of exports from
the 1880s.1 After the problems of reputation of the 19th century, there were two new periods
of export expansion in the sherry trade, first occurring in 1919-1940 and second in 1958-
1980. During the 20th century, Spanish shippers used own brands as a way to overcome the
reputations problems created by fraudulent wines. Brands were especially important in the
growth of exports as they led firms to create and enhance their own image and to avoid
reputation problems.2 They were also a valuable intangible asset for producers, allowing the
Spanish leading firms to obtain economies of scale and to consolidate their market share.3
But wine is a commodity very difficult to be branded.4 In the sherry industry the
introduction of a new method of maturation in the 18th century allowed the production of a
wine that could be very easily branded. The new process aimed at producing a uniform
wine in age and character. In this new system sherry was matured in the solera, a scale of
oak casks containing wine of the same type, in which sherry in different stages of
1 Simpson (2002 and 2005)
2 About the effects of quality uncertainty on markets and the use of brands to avoid reputation problems, see
Akerlof (1970). Brands allowed firms to give information to the purchaser, providing a guarantee of
continuing standards of quality to consumers and allowing firms to avoid reputation problems. Wilkins (1992
and 1994)
3 Wilkins (1992) and Lopes (2002b) have emphasized the role of brands in the growth of international
business. Lopes (2002b) argues that marketing knowledge, as well as brands, was also important in the
growth of firms in foreign markets.
4 González Gordon (1970 and 1990); Maldonado Rosso (1999). Other processed wines are champagne and
port. See Boulet and Laporte (1976: 66-75) on corporate concentration in Champagne industry and Lopes
(1998) in Port. Non-processed wine is very difficult to be branded as great number of growers produces a
wide variety of wines, whose quality differs yearly and across regions. In fact, wine-making and wine
distribution in the European producing countries is traditionally highly fragmented in small family firms, so
that wine exports are geographically branded and the level of corporate concentration in production and
distribution is not very high. Cavanagh and Clairmonte (1999); Anderson (2004). As oppose as old wine
producing countries, new producers, such as the United States, achieved a great level of concentration in light
wine production from the 1970s. In the U.S., Gallo was the largest wine company accounted for 33 per cent of
all wine sales. The largest eight wine companies accounted for 65 per cent of wine sales (Folwell and
Baritelle, 1978: 38-39).
maturation was blended, obtaining a wine of no particular vintage, which maintained its
quality from one year to another.5 During the 19th century, sherry was retailed under
distributor’s brands. Although Spanish sherry firms launched premium brands (such as Tío
Pepe) as a way to prevent the adulteration of their wines during the 19th,6 it was in the 20th
century when these Spanish brands were extensively popularized in the British market. The
numerous fraudulent practises that finally caused the end of the export expansion, prompted
the leading Spanish firms to focus mainly on the promotion and sale of own brands in
Britain. From the 1920, leading shippers also increased their commitment with the import
market, establishing tighter alliances with distributors or own distribution subsidiaries,
starting a process of internationalization that accelerated in the second half of the 20th
century.
This paper is divided into 5 sections. Section 1 considers the first period of
expansion of sherry exports in 1919-1940 when the Spanish leading sherry houses changed
the distribution approach, establishing distribution alliances or wholly-owned subsidiaries
and popularizing their own brands through wide advertising campaigns. Section 2 analyses
the second expansion of sherry in 1958-1980, when Spanish independent firms continued
the strategy to sell their own brands in the British market. Section 3 analyse the extension
to which imitations and the cheap sherries (produced by new entrants to the sherry industry)
were sold in the British market from 1960 onwards. The increasing competition placed by
both cheap sherries and imitations led Spanish firms to compete on prices. The decline of
profitability of the Spanish sherry firms because of this strategy prompted firms to integrate
into production from the 1970s, a process analysed in Section 4. Finally, section 5
concludes.
1. Changes in the marketing approach and expansion of sherry exports to the
UK, 1919-1940
The budget issued in 1860 by Prime Minister William Gladstone had diverted the
British taste from the heavy fortified wines (port and sherry) to the French lighter wines.7
5 González Gordon (1970 and 1990) and Maldonado Rosso (1999)
6 Simpson (2005), p. 378
7 Simpson (2005)
However, when World War I finished, the British consumers developed again a taste for
fortified wines, which became increasingly popular for the public.8 During the inter-war
period, the consumption per caput of all types of wines in the UK remained remarkably
steady.9 However, the average total consumption increased by 20 per cent from 570
thousand hectolitres per annum in 1900-1914 to 689 thousand in 1919-1927.10 Most of the
increase in total consumption of wine consisted of Portuguese and Spanish fortified wines,
whose imports increased by more than 30 per cent from 1920 to 1927, as opposed to the
decline in the imports of Spanish and French light reds by another 30 per cent in the same
period. Moreover, as a consequence of the duty preference given to Empire wines in 1927,
French and Spanish red wines continued their decline by 40-45 per cent.11 The consumption
of Empire wines increased from 7 per cent in 1900 to 23 per cent of the total UK
consumption in 1931, caused especially by the growth of imports of Australian wines,
which multiplied by 6 between 1930 and 1933.12 Although imports of Port also decreased
by a 40 per cent because of the duty increase, the rising tendency of sherry exports
continued from 1927, growing by 50 per cent up 100 thousand hectolitres in 1933. Besides
the expansion of the market in the UK, the demand for sherry also increased in other
countries and total exports of sherry multiplied by 3 from 77 thousand hectolitres in 1920 to
250 thousand in 1940 (graphic 1).
The increasing popularity of sherry in the British market from 1920 was possible
because shippers were able to maintain a very solid standard of quality, favouring quality
before quantity. Sherry firms could also enlarge their business because of the extensive
advertising of own brands.13 Furthermore, the Sherry Shippers Association, formed in
London at the beginning of the 20th century to the aim of popularizing the product and
defending the interests of the shippers in the UK market, made generic campaigns to foster
8 Ridley’s (1931), no. 1000, p. 98
9 That was the case also of the 19 th century (Simpson, 2005). During the years 1924 to 1930, the average
annual consumption per caput was 2.97 pints, which was practically the same as from 1886. Ridley’s (1932),
no. 1019, p. 611
10 Calculated from Annuaire Statistique de la France (1924) and Ridley’s (1932) , no. 1019, p. 611
11 Calculated from Ridley's (various years)
12 Ridley’s (1932), no. 1019, p. 612
13 Harpers (1933), n. 2544, p. 547, 561 and Ridley’s (1933), no. 1031, p. 685 and (1935), no. 1047, p. 5
Although most of the sherry consumed in the UK was sweet wine, the gradual increase of sherry exports to
the UK consisted mainly on dry sherry, which increasingly became popular as an aperitif, competing
successfully with cocktails. The increasing consumption of sherry as an aperitif was due also to diversion of
taste from whisky because of its relative high price. Ridley’s (1932) , no. 1011, p. 5
the consumption of the product. These campaigns consisted mainly on systematic adverts in
the daily press and the organization of an annual Sherry Week (first organized in 1924),
which permitted the revival of this beverage.14
Graphic 1
Total Exports of sherry in 1850-1994, in thousand hectolitres
Source: elaborated from GEHR (1989: 113-114) and Consejo Regulador de las
Denominaciones de Origen Jerez-Xérès-Sherry y Manzanilla-Sanlúcar de Barrameda
(1994)
During this period, Spanish sherry houses also changed their distribution approach
in the British market. In 1920, Domecq decided to end the trading of their wines in bulk
and to market bottled sherry under their own labels. Having decided this change in the
distribution approach, Domecq cancelled the distribution agreement with its distributor,
14 Ridley’s (1926), no. 939, p. 23 and (1927), no. 951, p. 9
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1.400
1.600
185
0
18
55
186
0
186
5
187
0
187
5
18
80
188
5
18
90
189
5
190
0
190
5
191
0
191
5
192
0
192
5
193
0
19
35
194
0
19
45
195
0
195
5
196
0
196
5
19
70
197
5
19
80
198
5
19
90
Matthew Clark, and established a tighter alliance with Luis Gordon.15 This new approach
was followed by other firms, especially by González Byass and, consequently, the
percentage of sherry exported in bottle accounted for 20 per cent of total exports in the
period 1926–1940, and the largest volume of bottled sherry was exported by Pedro Domecq
(47 per cent) and González Byass (17 per cent).16 The use of brands increased the level of
concentration of the exports in a few shippers continuing a process initiated at the
beginning of the 19th century. In 1850-1870, when the exports were growing fast, the total
number of shippers increased from an average of 70 to 90, and the leading 10 shippers sold
around 50 per cent of total exports.17
During the export boom of the 19th century, González Byass and Pedro Domecq
rivalled each other for the position of leading shippers (table 1). Both firms established
alliances with distributors in England and those alliances allowed them to consolidate their
export share after a process of internal growth. In 1833 Pedro Domecq, formed as a joint
venture between a Spanish shipper and a British agent, was the leader with about 9 per cent
of total exports.18 However, Domecq was replaced in the top position by González Byass
from the 1850s (table 1), after the firm was established in 1855 as an alliance between two
growers associated for the production of sherry (González & Dubosc) and Byass, a British
distributor who had operated as the sole agent of González and Dubosc’s sherry from
1836.19 From the 1850s, exports from the firm grew steadily to 9 per cent of total sherry
exports in 1861-1873, placing the firm as the export leader.
This process of concentration among a few shippers consolidated during the
expansion of the 1919-1940, because of the use of brands by the leading shippers. The level
of concentration in 1926-1940 almost doubled that of 1871-2. In 1871-2, the first ten
leading firms concentrated 47 per cent of total exports, González Byass being the leader
with 10 per cent (table 2). González Byass was followed by Misa and Garvey, with a
percentage of 8 and 5 per cent, respectively. Domecq was in the fourth position with a mere
15 Ridley’s (1920), no. 879, p. 604 and (1921), no. 879, p. 40
16 Calculated from Garvey Archive: Estadísticas (1870-1930) and (1931-1949).
17 Calculated from Archivo Garvey. Estadísticas (1850-1870)
18 In the early 19th century, Pierre Domecq established the firm “Ruskin, Telford & Domecq”, which operated
as the sole agent of Juan Haurie, a Spanish shipper. This shipper acquired all the capital share of Juan Haurie,
founding Pedro Domecq. Since then, “Rusking, Tedlord & Domecq” (Pedro Domecq & Co. from 1864) along
with two partners, R.W. Willis and H. Scott, were in charge of the marketing of the sherry that Pedro Domecq
produced in Spain. See Lignon-Darmaillac (2004), p. 229-240
4 per cent of total exports. In contrast, in 1926-1940 ten leading firms were responsible for
82 per cent of the export trade. The increasing concentration of exports was due to the
internal growth of the three leading firms, Domecq, Byass and Williams & Humbert, which
jointly concentrated 55 per cent of total exports. Domecq recaptured the first position again
after changing its system of distribution. Its exports increased from an average of 11
thousand hectolitres in the peak years of the export boom in the 19th century to more than
45 thousand hectolitres in 1926-1940, accounting for 26 per cent of all exports. The sale of
its brand Tío Pepe from González Byass, which operated as a distributor of own brands in
the UK, increased and recovered the exports levels of the previous boom (25-30 thousand
hectolitres) and become second major shipper with a 16 per cent share in 1926-1940.
Williams and Humbert, founded in 1877, which sold its famous brands Dry Sack in the
British market through its own subsidiary, was the third larger exporter with 13 per cent of
exports, and an average of almost 24 thousand annual hectolitres.20 Finally, in contrast with
the strategy of these firms, other large Jerez houses, such as Garvey and Misa, continued to
supply wines to British agents and showed a decline in their average annual exports as well
as in their share of the trade.21
Table 1
Leading firms in the sherry industry during the 19 th century, in percentage of total exports
1833-1844 1851-1860 1861-1873
Domecq 9,1 5,7 4,9
González Byass 5,9 9,2
Garvey 5,6 5,5 5,5
Misa 3,5 6,6
Source: for the period 1833-1844, Maldonado (1999); for the period 1851-1873, calculated
by the author from Archive of Garvey: Estadísticas (1851-1870).
19 Montañés (2000) and Lignon-Darmaillac (2004), p. 229-240
20 Wine and Spirit (1974), vol. 102, no. 1202, p. 41.
21 That was the case of Garvey, which from 1916 had an agency agreement with Matthew Clark to supply
bulk wines in order to bottle and sell wine with the agent brand. Garvey Archive. Garvey (London) Ltd.
Table 2
Concentration in the sherry exports in 1871-2 and 1926-1940
1871-2 1926-1940
Hectolitres Percentage Hectolitres Percentage
Pedro Domecq 11.217 4 46.605 26
González Byass 26.745 10 30.578 16
Williams & Humbert - - 24.309 13
Misa 21.086 8 4.987 2
Garvey 14.899 5 3.591 2
Total 280.714 100 184.915 100
Ten leaders 130.935 47 150.729 82
Source: elaborated from Garvey Archive: Estadísticas (1871-1930) and Estadísticas (1931-
1950)
In spite of the efforts of the Sherry Shippers Association and the new strategy of the
firms to enhance the reputation of sherry through brands, some shippers continued to export
inferior sherries to the UK in order to sell at very cheap prices during the 1920s and 1930s.
Moreover, it was also common that certain merchants and distributors sold wines labelled
as “sherry” at prices that suggested serious adulteration practises.22 Although the sale of
cheap and false wines was seen as detrimental to the trade and risked a return to the years
after the 1870s, when the shipping of imitations and inferior wines caused the decline of the
trade, the export boom of the inter-war period finished because of the outbreak of World
War II. During the wartime blockage, exports fell to 50-90 thousand hectolitres, a mere 30
per cent of the pre-war years, and the inability to obtain supplies increased the sales of
imitations, the so-called “sherry-styles”, which flourished in the UK.23 The restrictions on
imports of luxury goods in the post-war period resulted in sherry imports stagnating at
around 150 thousand hectolitres until 1950 (graphic 1). In the UK, there were quotas on the
sherry imports and wines duties increased by 600 per cent in the period 1938-1950.24
Conditions of Spanish economy under Franco dictatorship had also negative effects on the
22 Ridley’s (1931), no. 1007, p. 614 and (1933), no. 1031, p. 685
23 Ridley’s (1963), no. 1386, p. 258
wine trade. During the 1940s, most industries worked half time due to the shortages of
electric power, and companies faced financial difficulties because of the shortages of
credit.25 During the 1950s, total exports of sherry stabilised around 200-250 thousand
annual hectolitres, and the UK consumption of sherry increased slightly from 138 thousand
hectolitres in 1938-9 to 150 thousand in 1958-59, at a time when the sales of other wines
doubled mainly because import duties increased less.26
As a result of the import restriction, most of the sherry was sold under the brands of
the British distributors and sherry substitutes and imitations had heavily popularized in the
British market between 1940 and 1960. Indeed, in the early 1960s, the four leading brand
names were those of the British distributors, part of alcoholic beverages groups very
integrated into retailing (table 3). Only one Spanish independent firm, Domecq, had
maintained the popularity of their brands from the end of the previous expansion.27 In 1960,
the leading brand name was Bristol Cream, belonging to Harvey, a British wine distributor
with their own retail network, which enjoyed 10% of total market share.28 Other
distributors that sold sherry brands in the UK market were brewing companies that had
diversified into the distribution of wines and spirits after the decrease of beer consumption
in the British market.29 That was the case of the Courage, whose subsidiary, Kinloch
distributed brands of whisky and rum as well as Spanish table wines and a sherry sold
under the name Cuesta.30 Stowell, a subsidiary of Whitbread, bottled and labelled the
Garvey’s sherry under the Caroza brand.31 Finally, Ind. Coope, part of Allied Breweries,
introduced Regency sherry in the early 1950s and their sales rapidly increased during the
1960s.32
24 Ridley’s (1949), no. 1216, p. 84 and (1950), no. 1235, p. 638
25 Ridley’s (1949), no. 1217, p. 155 and no. 1218, p. 227
26 During the 1950s, the UK duties on sherry had increased by 375 per cent from the pre-war levels, whilst
those of light wines had only done by 225 per cent. Ridley’s (1960), no. 1348, p. 78-79
27 The Domecq marketing strategy consisted on advertising and distributing its brands in supermarkets.
Garvey Archive. Informe al Consejo (1973).
28 Ridley’s (1960), no. 1351, p. 307 and (1964), no. 1399, p. 274; see also Lopes (2004).
29 Gourvisch and Wilson (1994) and Lopes (2002)
30 The Group, formed after the association of H & G Simonds with Charles Kinloch, subsidiary of Courage,
had more than 4.800 licensed houses, including 450 off-licensed. Courage Barclay & Simonds Limited
(1962): Report and Account.
31 Whitbread and Company Limited: Reports and Accounts 1961. Stowells also sold some Domecq brands in
Great Britain. Garvey Archive: Informe al Consejo, 1973.
32 In order to assure the continuity of the supply of sherry, Allied Breweries signed an agreement with Geo G.
Sandman’s Sons & Co. Ltd, later reinforced with the acquisition of part of the share of Sandeman. Allied
Table 3
Some leading brands sold in the British market in the early 1960s
Firm Group (Acquisition year) Brand
Harvey of Bristol Allied Breweries (1966) Bristol Cream
Domecq Independent Various
Kinloch & Co Courage Cuesta
Stowell Whitbread Caroza
Ind. Coope Allied Breweries (1961) Regency
Source: see text.
2. The use of brands and the expansion of sherry exports in the United
Kingdom, 1958-1979
The rising living standards in Northern Europe and changes introduced in the
retailing system increased the demand for sherry and other wines from 1950. Total exports
of sherry grew from 180 thousand hectolitres in 1950 to more than 1.5 millions hectolitres
in 1980 (graphic 1). As in the previous exports booms, the main market for sherry was the
UK which accounted for 65 per cent of sales in 1955-1969. However, exports increasingly
diversified into other markets, so that sales in the UK accounted for only 55 per cent of
total exports in the 1970s.33 In the UK, the demand for sherry and other alcoholic beverages
expanded thanks to higher per capita incomes and the Licensing Act of 1961. Additionally,
the government reduced the duties on sherry in 1958 and again in 1960.34 As a consequence
of these duty reductions, exports to this country multiplied by 3 from 1958 up to 760
thousand hectolitres in 1979 (graphic 2).
The growth of the sherry consumption in the UK was made possible through the use
of heavy advertising by sherry shippers to promote their own brands. The sherry firms’
Breweries Limited: Reports and Accounts 1963 and 1964; Ind. Coope, Tetley, Ansell Limited: Reports and
Accounts 1962
33 Calculated from Consejo Regulador de las Denominaciones de Origen Jerez -Xérès-Sherry y Manzanilla-
Sanlúcar de Barrameda
34 Ridley’s (1960), (1960), no. 1348, p. 78 and no. 1352, p. 378 and (1964), no. 1405, p. 644. Prior to the
Licensing Act of 1961 alcoholic beverages only could be sold in specific outlets. The new licensing law
allowed supermarkets and other premises to retail alcoholic drinks. See Cavanagh and Clairmonte (1985), p.
152.
total spending on advertising increased from £775 thousand in 1966 to almost £2 million at
the beginning of the 1970s.35 During the 1970s, fortified wine categories, especially sherry,
were traditionally the biggest spenders in press and television advertising, responsible for
18-20 per cent of total expenditure for wines and spirits, followed by vermouth and whisky.
Moreover, the total advertising expenditure for sherry continued to increase fastest than that
for other wines and spirits, doubling from £1.8 million a year in 1971-1972 to £3.3 in 1975-
76 (table 4). As a consequence of these advertising and promotional campaigns, sherry
became the second alcoholic drink consumed in the British market in terms of volume after
beer.36
Graphic 2
Sherry exports to the UK in 1955-1999, in thousand hectolitres
Source: elaborated from Consejo Regulador de las Denominaciones de Origen Jerez-Xérès-
Sherry y Manzanilla-Sanlúcar de Barrameda
35 RUMASA Archive (Fondo Antiguo, Caja 36: Marketing Report Varela Sherries, 1968) and table 7
36 Harpers (1975), no. 4737, p. 572.
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Table 4
Total annual spending in press and TV advertising in the UK market of alcoholic drinks, in
1971-1976 (£ millions)
1971-1972 1973-1974 1975-1976
Sherry 1,8 2,4 3,3
Vermouth 1,7 2,6 3,2
Whiskey 1,4 2,0 2,5
Brandy and liqueurs 1,2 1,9 2,3
Cider and Perry 1,2 1,5 2,2
Gin and Vodka 1,1 1,7 1,6
Table wines 1,6 1,6 1,7
Rum 0,3 0,4 0,4
Port 0,3 0,5 0,3
Total 10,5 14,5 17,7
Source: calculated from Wine and Spirit (1973: no. 1186) and (1977: no. 1234).
During this expansion of trade, the Spanish firms continued the strategy initiated in
the 1920s and 1930s to sell their own brands. As a result, brands of the Jerez houses once
more gained market share, and together with Harvey’s brands, had became leaders in the
UK market during the 1970s. Seven firms dominated the British market for sherry but only
three of them were independent Spanish houses, González Byass, Williams & Humbert and
Domecq (table 5). Two of the other four were British distributors traditionally specialised
in sherry (Harvey and Grants of St. James, part of Ind. Coope), together with two new firms
established in the Jerez area by multinationals (Croft, part of the IDV Group, and
Sandeman, part of Allied).37
37 Croft was a leading port shipper and a subsidiary of Gilbey (IDV Group), which also sold bulk sherry into
Northern Europe countries, and an own brand, Croft Original. Croft increased their sherry sales during the
1970s until being placed in value terms amongst the top four shippers in 1980, mainly because the distribution
Table 5
Main sherry brands and suppliers between 1960 and 1980
Supplier Parent Brands
John Harvey and Sons Allied Breweries Bristol Cream, Club Amontillado,
Luncheon Dry
Grants of San James (Ind.
Coope)
Allied Breweries Regency
Sandeman Allied Breweries Sandeman
Croft (Gilbeys Vintners) Grand Metropolitan
(IDV)
Croft Original
González Byass Independent Tío Pepe, Elegante, La Concha
Pedro Domecq Independent Double Century, La Ina, Celebration
Cream
Williams & Humbert Independent Dry Sack
Source: see text
In the 1960s, sweet sherry accounted for about 70 per cent of the British market
(table 6), with Harvey, especially with its Bristol Cream, accounted for 35 per cent of the
sweet sherry market, followed by Domecq, which had nearly 15 per cent.38 Bristol Cream
(launched by the firm in the 1880s) had the advantage of being a pioneering and well-
established brand, and Harvey was the highest press and TV advertising spender at the
beginning of the 1970s (table 7), which allowed it to consolidate its position as the best
brands’ seller in the 1970s. 39 From 1971, Harvey’s total expenditure doubled from £408
thousand to £803 in 1976, and most of it allocated to two of their brands, Bristol Cream and
Bristol Dry.
support of IDV. Ridley’s, no. 1375 (1962), p. 300 and Harpers (1975), no. 4739, p. 466; Wine and Spirit
(1980), vol. 106, no. 1273, p. 32
38 RUMASA Archive (Fondo Antiguo, Caja 36: Marketing Report Varela Sherries, 1968)
39 In contrast to patents, brands do not prevent competitors for making the same good and segmenting the
markets. Consumers can also switch to alternatives or other brands. The monopoly of the first entrant can be
overcome by product differentiation (case of Pedro Domecq or González Byass in the British market) or by
selling at a lower price (case of new entrants to the sherry trade such as the different firms of the Rumasa
holding). Schmalensee (1982), Wilkins (1992), p. 86-87
Table 6
Main styles of sherry sold in the British market (1968-1980), in percentages
Source: elaborated from Wine and Spirit (1968), no. 1134, p. 1120; Harpers (1980), no.
4986, p. 42; Retail Business, No. 369, November 1988, p. 55.
Although Harvey (especially with its Bristol Cream) had the advantage of being
first entrant and even consolidated its position as the best selling brand in the 1970s, other
brands became also important. Harvey was followed in advertising expenditure by
Domecq’s brands, especially Double Century and Celebration Cream, and the growth of
advertising spending for Domecq’s brands increased much more from £137 thousand to
£651 (table 7). Wide advertising campaigns and the distribution approach implemented by
its sole agents in the UK, Luis Gordon, increased the sales of Domecq’s Double Century
and Celebration Cream brands, so that by 1973 this firm had captured 24 per cent of the
sweet sherry market, rivalling Harvey dominance position.40 The brands of the two other
Spanish independent houses, González Byass’ Tío Pepe and Williams & Humbert’s Dry
Sack, whose advertising expenditure were smaller (table 7), dominated the market for
medium and dry sherry, which only accounted for a third of the British market (table 5).41
Sherry firms increased their business by developing line extensions, mainly
launching brands of medium and dry sherry.42 That was the case of Domecq. Although
Double Century accounted for 60% of the Luis Gordon’s sales in Britain, it also marketed
other Domecq’s brands, such as Celebration Cream, Casino Amontillado and La Ina.43 The
main brand of Harvey it was also sold under different tastes (Bristol Cream, Bristol Dry,
40 Wine and Spirit (1973) no. 1192, p. 67.
41 RUMASA Archive (Fondo Antiguo, Caja 36: Marketing Report Varela Sherries, 1968)
42 The aim of this strategy, which is a low risk method of launching new products, is to target new markets,
taking advantages of the reputation of a long-established brand. See Lopes (2002), p. 2-4
43 Wine and Spirit (1973), vol. 102, no. 1190, p. 26.
1968 1970 1979 1980
Sweet/ cream (oloroso) 47
Pale cream
70 70
11
56
Medium (amontillado) 20 20 29 30
Dry (fino) 10 10 13 14
Bristol Milk and Bristol Fino) and Harvey also launched Club Amontillado, a medium
sherry and Luncheon Dry, a dry sherry.44 As a result of this strategy of product
differentiation of the firms, during the 1970s there was a slow shift towards medium and
dry blends. In 1979, the British market was still dominated by the sweet style with 47 per
cent of total sales, but the development of line extensions made that the sales of medium
sherry rose up to 29 per cent of total sales. The sale of dry sherry, leaded by Tío Pepe also
increased up to 13 per cent of the market and that of the pale cream sherry, especially
represented by Croft Original, did up to 11 per cent (table 5).
Table 7
Press and TV spending on major sherry labels, in 1972-1976 (£ thousands)
1971 1972 1973 1.974 1.976
Harvey 408 523 577 702 803
Domecq 137 173 182 559 651
Emya Cream Cyprus 277 305 228 184 n.d.
Crofts - 115 161 164 n.d.
Williams and Humbert's Dry Sack 38 104 197 131 n.d.
González Byass 64 74 73 81 n.d.
RSVP's British sherry 110 37 - - n.d.
Total 9.747 11.259 13.425 15.568 18.067
Source: elaborated from Wine and Spirit (1973), no. 1186, (1975), no. 1210 and (1977), no.
1234
3. The competition in the UK market from imitations and new entrants to
the sherry industry, 1970-1980
During the 1970s, inferior sherries and imitations were extensively sold in the
British market. The new firms established in Jerez from the 1950s, attracted by the
expansion of the demand for sherry, sold cheap and inferior sherries to gain entry and
44 EIU (1980), p. 80-81. González Byass intended to appeal to a youngish audience by launching in 1975 a
complete range (Cream, Pale Cream and Medium) of a low price sherry under the brand Sun. Wine and Spirit
(1975), no. 1218, p. 63 and Harpers (1976), no. 4767, p. 546
compete with the established brands. If the number of shippers in 1927-1940 accounted for
about 60 firms, the number had increased to about 85 in the 1970s, and the level of
concentration of exports in the 10 largest firms decreased from 80 per cent in 1927-1940 to
63 per cent in 1972-1974 (table 8).45 Domecq and González Byass were again the leading
shippers but their exports share had fallen to some 12 and 9 per cent respectively. The loss
of their export share came mainly from the growing exports of the three new firms
established in Jerez by multinationals (John Harvey, Sandeman and Croft) which accounted
for almost 20 per cent of the total exports of sherry in the 1970s.
Table 8
Major sherry shippers in the 1970s, in percentages
1972-4 1976
Volume Value Volume
Pedro Domecq 12,0 16,9 11,7
González Byass 8,5 8,7 13,4
Garvey 8,4 5,9 6,8
Sandeman 7,7 6,0 7,2
Zoilo Ruiz Mateos 6,2 6,4 11,7
Williams & Humbert 6,0 9,1 4,3
Palomino & Vergara 3,9 3,4 3,0
Antonio Barbadillo 3,6 3,1 2,2
Emilio Lustau 3,2 2,1 3,7
Croft Jerez 2,6 2,1 3,6
John Harvey & Sons 1,8 2,4 6,6
Source: Calculated from AGA (Sindicatos, legajo 5575. Exportación de vinos y licores:
1972-1974) and Lignon-Darmaillac (2004: 337).
45 In the champagne industry the level of concentration was slightly smaller. In 1953, 10 major firms
accounted for 46 per cent of total sales, while in 1960 and 1967 accounted for 55 per cent. The major firm,
Moët et Chandon, shared 13 and 20 per cent of champagne sales in 1968 and 1970. Concentration process in
champagne continued in the 1970s, when 10 major companies accounted more than 60 per cent of total sales.
From the end of the 1960s onwards, the growth strategy of companies was horizontal integration due to
problems of internal expansion (grape supply rigidity, difficulties of storage). For example, Moët et Chandon
controlled two other champagne maisons (Ruinart and Mercier) and created in 1971 a financial holding, Moet
Other firms that competed successfully with the old-established houses were those
belonging to the Ruiz-Mateos family, which competed in the international market through a
strategy of selling large quantities of wines at low prices. After establishing a one-year
contract to supply wines to Harvey in 1958, Ruiz Mateos family established the firm Zolio
Ruiz Mateos and developed a strategy of horizontal integration in order to increase
shipping capacity and to be able to supply the quantity that Harvey demanded. Until 1963,
Ruiz Mateos family acquired seven firms (table 9), although with the exception of Misa and
Palomino & Vergara, these firms were small and lacked important brands. When Zoilo
Ruiz Mateos and Harvey signed a new 99-year contract in 1964, these seven firms were
integrated into the Unión de Exportadores de Jerez, whose 10 per cent stocks were given to
Harvey’s.46 The alliance between Ruiz-Mateos and Harvey was reinforced by the election
of Zoilo Ruiz Mateos as a director of John Harvey & Sons, a subsidiary of the Harveys
Group in Spain, as well as the integration of some members of the Ruiz-Mateos family in
the boards of the Harveys of Bristol Group.47 This agreement was cancelled after the
takeover of Harvey by Showerings,48 but by then the Ruiz-Mateos holding had established
itself as one of the most important Jerez shippers and continued its policy of expansion. In
1972 the family, through its wholly-owned subsidiary Unión de Exportadores de Jerez,
acquired three more Jerez houses, Bertola, Lacave and Williams & Humbert, although only
the former had a strong brand, Dry Sack.49
By 1972, all the Ruiz-Mateos houses accounted for almost 25 per cent of total
exports,50 and in the following years its export capacity increased even more, with the
acquisition of more Jerez houses such as Garvey, Fernando A. de Terry or Diaz Mérito, and
in 1979 Rumasa launched Bodegas Internacionales, the first public company in the sherry
industry.51 Besides horizontal expansion, Ruiz Mateos integrated forward into distribution
in the UK market, with the acquisition at the beginning of the 1970s of a distribution
Hennessy. The second maison de champagne, Mumm controlled three other firms, Perrie -Jouet, Heidsieck
and Cie Monopole (Boulet and Laporte: 1976: 66-75).
46 Argüelles, 1992: chapters 1-2
47 Wine and Spirit (1966), no. 1109, p. 1146
48 Argüelles (1992) and Lignon-Darmaillac (2004)
49 When Rumasa bought Williams & Humbert, the advertising expenditure on Dry Sack increased from
£60.000 to £ 200.000. Wine and Spirit (1974), vol. 102, no. 1202, p. 41.
50 Calculated from AGA (Sindicatos: legajo 5575. Exportación de vinos y licores: 1972-1974)
51 Wine and Spirit (1980), vol. 106, no. 1271, p. 14.
company, Imported Wines.52 The holding also owned the British retail subsidiary Augustus
Barnett, with its network of 180 wine shops, allowing it to follow its strategy of selling
large quantities of very cheap sherry. The subsidiary distribution company, Imported
Wines, concentrated in the selling of a great quantity of very cheap single products,
although only the brand Dry Sack where distributed by exclusive agent, BB Vintners, also
part of the holding. Although Ruiz-Mateos commercialized a small quantity sherry under
premium brands, such as Don Zoilo or Duke of Wellington, and other cheaper brands (Misa,
Stowells, CWT), most of the business of the holding in the UK concentrated in the selling
of a huge quantity of cheap sherry through its retailing and distribution companies, with
competed directly with old established brands. Only from 1979 onwards, Augustus Barnett
adopted a new strategy by increasing the price of all its product range in order to increase
its margins. This change coincided with the aim of abandoning the strategy followed during
the 1960s and the 1970s of selling at low prices, as there were already competitors which
sold at prices even lower.53
Table 9
Firms acquired until 1973 by the Ruiz-Mateos Holding (sherry Section)
Firms Acquisition year
Unión de Exportadores de Jerez: 1964
Jiménez Valera 1960
Carlos de Otaolaurruchi 1961
Jaime F. Diestro 1961
Pemartín 1962
Misa 1963
Palomino & Vergara 1963
Williams & Humbert 1972
Bodegas Bertola 1972
Lacave 1972
52 Harpers (1973), no. 4625, p. 216.
53 Rumasa had also a wide business of storage in the UK. Its subsidiary, Sherry House, operated as a holding
for two storage companies, Testwood Vintners and Victoria Warehouse. Testwood Vintners bottled sherry
from Rumasa, but even that of its direct competitors such as that of the best selling South African firm,
SAWFA. Rumasa also had a substantial business of BOB. Wine and Spirit (1979), no. 1261, p. 36.
Díaz Morales 1973
Source: Archive of Rumasa.
Beside the competition placed by new entrants such as Ruiz Mateos, the old
established sherry firms faced the competition from other producers selling sherry
imitations, which were very cheap to produce. In fact, the word “sherry” was not reserved
for wines made in the Jerez district but could be used in Britain to describe beverages made
in Britain, South Africa, Australia and Cyprus.54 After the increasing consumption of these
sherry-style wines in Britain during World War II, the sale continued to expand, accounting
for more than 50 per cent of total British market in the 1970s (table 10), because of the
preferential rate of duty that they enjoyed.55 By this time, British sherry, a wine
manufactured from the juice of dehydrated grapes produced abroad, accounted for over a
third of the total British market for fortified wines, whilst Cyprus sherry sales represented
half this figure. In spite of similarities, at the beginning of the boom period of 1958-1980,
sherry and sherry-styles wines had different images and prices. British and Cyprus sherry,
as well as Montilla wines (produced in Spain and sold also as a substitute for sherry) had a
younger market profile than those that Spanish sherry and they were sold in the low-priced
segment of the market during the 1960s.56 Meanwhile, sherry shippers concentrated on the
sale of expensive sherry brands, for which British consumers had preference, as those of
Harvey, whose sales had the higher rate of increase.57
The British market for fortified wines became extremely competitive and, as a
consequence of their high prices, sherry started to be considered as a traditional, “serious”,
“middle-aged, middle-class” drink,58 increasingly threatened by the growing sales of
vermouth and sherry-style wines, which attracted a younger public, and by the cheap
Spanish sherries sold by the new entrants to the industry. Sherry firms formed different
strategies to compete with this dual threat. The leader Harvey, with its extensive
distribution and retail network, sold an increasingly great volume of its well-established
54 Wine and Spirit (1976), vol. 106, no. 1226, p. 29.
55 Ridley’s (1963), no. 1386, p. 258
56 Retail Business (1988), no. 369, p. 60. For instance, in the early 1960s, while sherry prices ranged from 18
to 26 shilling, South African sherry did from 12 to 15. Ridley’s (1962), no. 1374, p. 217
57 RUMASA Archive (Fondo Antiguo, Caja 36: Marketing Report Varela Sherries, 1968)
brands, backed by a high advertising budget, which allowed it to maintain significant price
differentials with imitations and cheap sherries. By contrast, companies such as Domecq
and González Byass tried to compete on prices in the 1970s. The increase of sales of the
Spanish brands was obtained by the increasing investment in advertising campaigns but
long-established firms also maintained prices very stable in the retail level, absorbing the
rise in production costs. Indeed, from the 1960s, Spanish firms cut margins in order to
obtain the loyalty of consumers and to maintain their market share. Until 1973, the leading
Spanish firms maintained retail prices at the same levels for years, in spite of the rising
costs of production in Spain and the duty increases. The higher prices of grapes, musts and
spirits in the growing area, as well as the devaluation of the pound and the increase of the
minimum export price, finally led companies to increase them in 1973.59
Table 10
Sales of sherry and sherry-style wines in the British market (1976-87), in percentage
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980-87
Sherry 36 46 46 47 45
British sherry 37 31 37 37 42
Cyprus sherry 23 20 15 12 7
All others 4 4 3 4 6
Source: calculated from Wine and Spirit (1979), no. 1261, p. 31 and Retail Business,
(1988), no. 369, p. 52.
Despite the drop in demand during the crisis of 1974-75, which caused a decline of
60 per cent of sherry exports (graphic 1) and the fall in sales of all types of wine, sherry
showed a good performance in the British market in relation with that of the sherry-style
wines and even improved their share in the market for fortified wines. Thereby in 1975 the
sale of Cyprus wine fell by 16 per cent, but the Spanish sherry sales reduced only by 8 per
cent. The reason for this outstanding performance of sherry at the time of an economic
crisis was the low retail prices at which sherry were sold during 1975, as Harvey and other
58 Wine and Spirit (1980), no. 1271, p. 14; Harpers (1975), no. 4737, p. 572 and Wine and Spirit (1976), no.
1226, p. 29
59 Wine and Spirit (1973), no. 1190, p. 26
leading firms absorbed the duty increase and the growth of production costs in order to
keep prising competitive. As a consequence of lower prices and the increase of the rate duty
for sherry-style wines, the price differential between Spanish sherry and other fortified
wines narrowed and consequently the price advantage of sherry imitations was removed.60
After the economic crisis of 1973-1974, the retail prices of the sherry from Spanish
independent firms remained again stable for 4 years (1973-1977).61 Price stability helped
sherry to become highly competitive and to reduce even more the price differentials
between Spanish sherry and sherry-style wines, which consequently lost their price
advantage.62 Stability was achieved thanks to the firm strategy of cutting margins, but some
shippers also reduced the alcoholic content of their wines from 20º to 17º when introduced
in Britain in order to take advantage of the lower duty bands on fortified wines.63 As a
consequence of all these practices, during the second half of the 1970s the sales of the
cheapest sherry increased substantially.64 Although the profitability of the sherry trade
declined, the sherry share of the market increased from 36 in 1976 to 46 per cent of the
market in 1977-1978. The gain was made at the expense of British and especially of Cyprus
sherry, whose share declined from 23 to 15 per cent of the total market in the same period
(table 10). As a result of the pricing decisions, in 1980 the Spanish sherry’s price
disadvantage had almost entirely disappeared. In the early 1970s British and Cyprus sherry
were positioned at the bottom of the market, while Spanish and South African drinks were
at the top (table 11), and a consumer paid 80 per cent more for Spanish sherry than for
British sherry, and about 60 per cent more than for Cyprus sherry. By contrast, in 1980,
most sherry, except for Harvey’s Bristol Cream and Gilbey’s Croft Original, was priced at
₤1.70-₤1.80, little more expensive than Cyprus sherry, whose best known brand, Emva,
usually retailed at about ₤1.70. Consequently, the gap between Spanish sherry and British
sherry also narrowed to a differential of only about 13 per cent.65
60 Harpers (1975), no. 4737, p. 572; Wine and Spirit (1976), no. 1226, p. 29
61 Harpers (1976), no. 4777, p. 173
62 Harpers (1976), no. 4783, p. 378 and 390 and Wine and Spirit (1978), n. 1246, p. 44. In 1976 the price
differential between Spanish and other sherry was as little as 20p.
63 Wine and Spirit (1978), n. 1246, p. 45
64 Harpers (1977), no. 4838, p. 642 and no. 4834, p. 446. Wine and Spirit (1978), no. 1250, p. 34. According
to Wines and Spirit (1978), sherry from Rumasa companies were at a very bargain price.
65 EIU (1980), p. 76
Table 11
Retail prices of all types of sherry in the UK market, 1973-1980 (₤)
1973 1980
South African 0,7 1,8
Spanish 0,8 1,7-1,8
Cyprus 0,5 1,7
Montilla 0,7 1,5
British 0,5 1,5
Source: EIU (1980), p. 76
Only Harvey and Gilbey, which commercialized the Croft’s brands, managed to
support much higher prices on big advertising budgets. Harvey continued to be the heaviest
spender with ₤1.47 millions in 1979 and 40 per cent of all Spanish sherry advertising.
Gilbey was the second spender with more than ₤0.6 millions. As a consequence two single
brands, Bristol Cream and Croft Original together accounted for ₤1.9 millions of
advertising in 1979, which represented a 70 per cent of all spending on Spanish sherry.
Harvey’s brands dominated the UK market with 31 per cent of total sales, Bristol Cream
accounting for 20 per cent of all sherry and Club Amontillado , with about 8 per cent of all
sales, being the leading brand in the medium sector to 31 per cent in 1979 (table 12).66 But
Harvey had about twice the share than its nearest rival Gonzalez Byass, as the two
companies operated in different market segments, Harvey maintaining a premium image
and high prices, while Gonzalez Byass competing on price. Furthermore, although
González Byass increased its advertising budget up to ₤0.2 millions in 1979, it still was a
small budget in comparison to those of Harvey and Gilbey.67
Domecq, although maintaining the third place in advertising expenditure, decreased
substantially their advertising budget from ₤0.7 millions in 1976 to ₤0.4 in 1979.
Consequently, the market share of their brands fell from 20-25 per cent in the early 1970s
66 Wine and Spirit (1975) no. 1218, p. 63; Harpers (1975), no. 4743, p. 698; Wine and Spirit (1978), vol. 103,
no. 1250, p. 34 Wine and Spirit (1979), no. 1261, p. 31. EIU (1980), p. 85-86
67 EIU (1980), p. 85-86
to 13 per cent in 1979 (table 12).68 However, the second largest single brand after Bristol
Cream was the Domecq Double Century range, with about 10 per cent of the sales. Croft
Original from Gilbey, with about 7.5 per cent of the volume, became very important in the
pale cream, selling at the premium segment as Bristol Cream. In the dry sector, Gonzalez
Byass was the most important supplier with about 32 per cent of volume, followed by
Harvey with Luncheon Dry (about 13 per cent). 69
Table 12
Sherry market shares by supplier and brand in 1979, in percentage of volume
Firm Brand Percentage
Harvey 31
Bristol Cream 20
Club Amontillado 8
González Byass 17
Elegante 2,5
Domecq 13
Domecq Double century
range
10
Gilbey 8
Croft Original 7,5
Own label 10
Other brands 21
Source: EIU (1980), p. 82
As a result of the advertising campaigns and the pricing decisions, there was only
one brand of a Spanish independent firm (Domecq's Double Century) among the six
products with strong brand recognition in the British market for fortified wines, according
to a 1978 private survey (table 13). Top of the list was Harvey’s Bristol Cream, but second
68 Wine and Spirit (1978), no. 1250, p. 34-35. According to the marketing director of Luis Gordon & Sons,
Domecq brands lost their market share because of a price elevation decision that tried to increase margins, but
put Domecq’s sherry out of competition. Wine and Spirit (1979), no. 1261, p. 33.
69 EIU (1980), p. 79
and third positions were two sherry-styles: Emva, a Cyprus sherry and VP&QC a British
sherry, whose advertising budgets maintained stagnant or decreased (table 7).
Table 13
1978-private survey on brand recognition
Position Brand
1 Harvey’s Bristol Cream
2 Emva
3 VP&QC
4 Croft
5 Domecq's Double Century
6 Monte Cristo
Source: Wine and Spirit (1978), vol. 103, n. 1246, p. 45.
4. The integration into production of the sherry firms from the 1970s
In order to succeed in their strategy of competing on prices, shippers needed a
supply of large quantity of relative cheap young wines. However, the rapidly increase in
demand in the UK and other countries during the 1960s and the 1970s created supply
problems which, together with the increasing production costs, prompted Spanish firms to
integrate into production. From 1970s onwards, large Spanish houses largely invested in
vineyards in order to ensure the availability of large stocks of wines. The ownership of
vineyards was also seen as a key to maintain the quality and price of own brands.70
Moreover, an official Spanish Shippers’ Committee aimed at obtaining the exclusive use of
the word “sherry” in the UK, which required the recognition of sherry as a wine exclusively
produced in the Jerez region, while firms had been used wines from outside of the region to
overcome the shortage in young wines from 1960. In order to remove the reliance on
foreign wines, it was necessary to increase the area of vineyards, which also prompted
firms to undertake themselves the new plantings.
70 Besides investment in vineyards, companies also established much more long-term contracts with other
vineyard owners. For instance, by 1973 Domecq offered to landowners 25-year contracts instead of the
Before the 1970s, shippers owned some vineyards, but the large part of their needs
were supplied by grape growers, assuring the quantity and quality specifications through
long-term contracts.71 However, they also started to integrate into production by acquiring
and planting new vineyards from 1970. One of the largest vineyards owner was Pedro
Domecq, which in 1973 owned more than 800 hectares of vineyards (8 per cent of the total
Jerez vineyards), producing 65 per cent of its total needs. In the following year the area of
Domecq vineyards expanded even more, up to being able to produce 80 per cent of all of its
young wines.72
Additionally, multinationals that operated in the international sherry market
(especially Allied and IDV), which previously did not have any interest in the area, also
integrated into production from 1970 onwards. One of the reasons for the multinationals to
invest in vineyards was to break the monopoly of some of the largest Spanish companies in
the area, which had initiated a strategy of taking over independent suppliers.73 As explained
above, the Rumasa holding and the two main independent firms, Domecq and González
Byass, were responsible for almost half of the total exports. In front of the increasing
concentration of shocks in these three firms and in order to assure the supply of sufficient
wines, multinationals established own houses in the area and also integrated into grape
growing, forming alliances with local producers from 1970.
Prior to 1970 Harvey, part of Allied, signed contracts with local suppliers, but it did
not own shipping capacity or vineyards in the Jerez area.74 In 1960 Harvey had formed a
new company in Jerez, John Harvey (España), but only with the objective to supply the
Spanish and German markets. The shortages of supply prompted Harvey to integrate into
production with the aim to produce at least 25 per cent of their total supply.75 It was in 1970
that Harvey began to build a base in Jerez with the purchase of a sherry producer,
Mackenzie, partly in order to secure continuity of sherry supplies and partly because of the
traditional 5-10-year ones . Wine and Spirit (1973), vol. 102, no. 1190, p. 26 and Wine and Spirit (1974), vol.
102, no. 1202, p. 38
71 Wine and Spirit (1973), vol. 102, no. 1190
72 With the integration into production, Domecq tried to maintain the production and quality of its own
brands. Wine and Spirit (1973), vol. 102, no. 1190, p. 26. Wine and Spirit (1974), vol. 102, no. 1202, p. 38.
73 That was the case of all the firms acquired by Rumasa, but also of other such as Agustín Blázquez, which
had been acquired by Pedro Domecq. Wine and Spirit (1974), vol. 102, no. 1202, p. 34.
74 After the cancellation of the agreement with Rumasa, the firm started again to buy their wines from about
12 suppliers, such as Garvey and Antonio Barbadillo. Wine and Spirit (1974), vol. 102, no. 1202, p. 34
75 Ridley’s (1960), nº. 1351, p. 304; Harpers, 1975, 31 octubre, 587
growing insistence on bottling at source, particularly within the EEC. In 1972 this purchase
was followed by the establishment of two joint venture companies to plant vineyards, one
with Garvey (Viñarvey) and the other with other producer, Barbadillo (Gibaldin), which in
1976 operated more than 800 hectares of vineyards.76 Finally in 1979, Harvey acquired a
Rumasa firm, Misa, which made Harvey the major vineyard owner and stockholder in
Jerez, together with Domecq.77 In the same way, Gilbey, part of IDV, had never taken
interest in Jerez production as it was supplied by González Byass. In the late 1960s, IDV
decided to produce wines from their own vineyards. Croft Jerez was founded in 1970 as a
joint venture between IDV, its traditional allied in the area (González Byass) and other
Spanish investors.78 In 1972, Croft had formed a new company in Spain, Vineyards Croft to
buy and plant vineyards in Jerez and by the middle of 1970s, Croft Jerez had purchased 400
hectares of vineyards in the Jerez Superior (albariza) zone.79
5. Concluding remarks
During the 20th century, the leading Spanish firms of the sherry industry focused
mainly on the sale of own brands to Britain as a way to overcome the reputation problems
that caused a decline of exports from 1870 onwards. The expansion of the British market
for sherry began in 1920 and continued throughout the 1930s. In contrast to the strategy of
the 19th century, from 1920 the business had a firm basis and the Spanish leading houses
popularized their own brands through wide advertising campaigns. The change of strategy
was accompanied with a change in the distribution approach of main firms, which
established distribution alliances or wholly-owned subsidiaries. The use of brands allowed
Spanish firms to grow internally and to increase their market share. However, the
expansion of exports swiftly finished due to the outbreak of World War II and during the
following two decades, duty taxes on sherry and other luxury products maintained at a high
levels and imports were subject to quotas, which caused a sharply decline in exports. After
76 Wine and Spirit (1974), vol. 102, no. 1202, p. 34. Wines & Spirit (1976), Vol. 106, No. 1226, p. 25.Wine
and Spirit (1980), no. 1271, p. 14-5. Archive of Garvey: Viñarvey.
77 Wine and Spirit (1980), no. 1271, p. 15.
78 In 1979, IDV had 75% of the capital share of Croft Jerez. Harpers, 1975 (31 oct), p. 584, and (1976), no.
4783, p. 382; Wine and Spirit (1980), vol. 106, no. 1273, p. 32.
79 Wine and Spirit (1973), vol. 102, no. 1190, p. 26 and Wine and Spirit (1974), vol. 102, no. 1202, p. 39.
the post-war period, the rising living standards in most developed countries and the
improvement of transportation and retailing systems caused an enlargement of the market
for wines. This change in demand was accompanied by the reduction of duties on strong
wines in Britain, which allowed the increase in sherry exports to the UK market. As in the
1920s and 1930s, leading firms used brands as a way to create their own reputation. In the
second half of the 20 th century, the increase of sales of the Spanish brands was obtained by
the increasing investment in advertising campaigns but long-established Spanish firms also
maintained prices very stable in the retail level, absorbing the rise in production costs. The
great part of the demand concentrated in only a few brands, and those of some old-
established Jerez houses achieved to improve their market share in the UK, although the
brand leader continued to be Harvey, a British distributor and the major advertising
spender. Even if during this period the British market for sherry was really segmented
between low-priced and expensive sherry, the competition imposed by new entrants and by
imitations increased. The imitations of sherry (the so-called sherry-styles), produced in
Britain and other countries and sold in the low-priced segment, retained a great part of the
market for fortified wines and represented a great competition to the Spanish houses.
Moreover, the expansion in demand attracted new entrants to the business, which
increasingly tried to overtake the market power of leading brands by selling at lower prices.
The increasing competition placed by both new entrants and imitations led firms to
compete on prices during the 1970s. Spanish firms cut margins in order to obtain the
loyalty of consumers and to maintain their market share. As a consequence, Spanish firms
placed their brands on the cheap segment of the market, selling at the same prices as those
of the imitators. The profitability of the sherry business in the UK declined which, together
with the volatility in demand and the seasonality of the sales and the difficulty to increase
the market even more, led firms to increasingly integrate into production as well as to
diversify into other markets and products.
The second expansion peaked in 1979 and from 1980 exports of sherry had
gradually decreased to half of the volume in the 1990s. Sherry exports to the UK decreased
by 60 per cent during the 1980s, because of the economic crisis and the competition from
other drinks with a younger market profile.80 Following the strategy of Spanish independent
firms to compete on price during the 1970s, the Spanish Shippers Committee decided to
enhance quality and restrain supply in the 1980s, and consequently the price differentials
between sherry and imitations increased again in the UK. Furthermore, the duty
discrimination in the UK favoured British sherry and Cyprus sherry against Spanish
sherry.81 The rising prices of sherry, the duty discrimination as well as the world economic
crisis favoured the decline of the international market for sherry. Nevertheless, although
during the 1980s there was a decline of the total volume, exports of bottled wines increased
from 25 per cent of total export in the 1970s to more than 80 per cent at the beginning of
the 1990s, as a result of a policy of bottling at source as a way to control quality.82
The marketing knowledge acquired by the use of brands and the increasing
commitment with the import markets through wholly owned distribution subsidiaries or
tight alliances with sole distributors allowed the international growth of the Spanish firms.
Although the international market for sherry declined from 1980 onwards, the Spanish
independent sherry firms had become international firms that operated in a great number of
countries as producers and distributors of a wide range of alcoholic beverages. The
international growth of these firms began in the 1920s, when Spanish firms started to
extensively use brands as a way to obtain the loyalty of the public. The use of brands as
well as the marketing knowledge obtained by strong alliances with distributors or wholly-
owned subsidiaries allowed Spanish firms to internationalize from the 1960s, becoming the
most important firms in the alcoholic-beverage sector in Spain in terms of sales.83
80 In fact, during the 1980s, there was a decline in the UK not only in the demand of sherry but also of that of
imitations. The fall in sales was particularly significant for Cyprus sherry, which decreased by 65 per cent
between 1978-9 and 1985-9. In contrast, the sales of British sherry decreased only by 5 per cent. Calculated
from Retail Business (1988), no. 369, p. 52
81 Spanish sherry must by law be a minimum of 15.5% alcohol by volume, which brought sherry into the 15-
18% UK duty band. On the contrary, British sherry could be fortified with combination of high and low
strengths of alcohol, thus qualifying for a lower duty rate. Cyprus sherry, as a fortified to up 15% alcohol by
volume, also qualified for lower tax as the wording of the 1985 Finance Act was changed to include 15% in
the light wine tax band. Retail Business (1988), no. 369, p. 54. Harveys (1988), p 18
82 Calculated from Consejo Regulador de las Denominaciones de Origen Jerez-Xérès-Sherry y Manzanilla-
Sanlúcar de Barrameda
83 See Fomento de la Producción (1991)
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